Military and civilian deaths are down for now. A look at how we got here will provide a glimpse of where Iraq might go next.
Shia militias, especially the Mahdi Army, were a home grown Iraqi solution to the chaos the followed the US occupation. US forces did not use tactics, nor did they have the personnel, to secure the safety of the local population. Rather, the US response to enemy activity resulted in further placing shia populations in danger from the US, or if the shia helped the US, from Sunni insurgent groups.
The shia are now and have always been viewed in Iraq as traitors (to Iraq) and rejectionists (of Islam as defined by Sunni). Their religous ties with Iran often lump all shia to be called Iranians by Iraqi sunni. Shia in government are a kin to Iranians in control to the sunni, and that is un-Iraqi. To the shia they share faith with the Iranians but have a historic distaste for them. As a matter of convenience they bought weapons and sought training from Iranian groups. In desperate times the "enemy of my enemy" is often your only friend. Iran was not in a position to refuse the money from arms sales and it is a matter of debate as to the degree of state sponsorship in the weapons sales.
Where the US could not provide protection to shia, and often when the US was doing the damage to them, the result was local militia. As a result of their beliefs, the banner of the Sadr movement was a natural common ground. These militia fought both the US, who unjustly (in their view and sometimes actually) attacked and incarcerated Shia, and the Sunni who include insurgents and al Qaeda who see the value of shia lives as worthless.
With the organization of the shia militia came a path to political power. As Muqtada centralized the militia under his banner the collective began to warrant political power. Their claim to political power earned them a different level of respect from the US, though they were still hunted as terrorists when applicable.
The Shia path to political power sparked some soul searching in the sunni bloc. If the shia gained political power and recognition then they could take control of the government and that would leave the sunni outside the power structure, again. In addition to this front, the sunni were facing more horrendous and less discriminate violence from their allies of convenience, al Qaeda. The Anbar tribes determined they were going to disappear from relevance if they faced attacks from US troops, al Qaeda crazies and the shia militia.
The calculated best hope for sunni survival was an alliance with the foreign occupiers (US) in order to gain legitimacy politically and favor in the struggle against shia and al Qaeda.
What is lost in Western media is that the situation was so dire that in AUG '06 the sunni initiated the Sons of Iraq movement on their own. 6 months before the thought of a US troop surge the sunni figured that their survival depended on collaborating with "the enemy of my enemies."
The US response was overwhelming. Weapons, material support and money all poured into the effort for the hearts and minds of the sunni. On their word, the US was now supporting the men who only days and hours ago were their sworn enemy to the death.
In the middle of all of this is the Iraqi government. A Shia based faction with ties to the Iranian supported resistance group of the '80s and '90s, the Badrs, the now US backed governing Shia are a minority and largely unpopular group. Their Shia ties to the Sadrs are not enough to overcome their differences in goals and priorities. The Us backed Badr influence is most visible in the Iraqi Army.
As all three sides escalated their efforts for security, position, retribution and control the world watched as hundreds of thousands of Iraqis were wounded or killed in sectarian violence. Millions of Iraqis were internally displaced as neighborhoods were purified and many more millions were forced to flee the country as refugees.
The minimal US presence still had a priority of hunting terrorists and keeping their own asses out of the fire at this time. Only after the violence peaked did the US gain enough political capital to send in a surge of troops to secure the peace after the blood bath. The surge troops had it tough, make no doubt. The Shia militia, Sunni insurgents, terrorists, and Iraqi government all had interests to protect against US intervention in the developing situation on the ground.
As US surge troops fought their way to a shaky equilibrium within Baghdad primarily, a combination of factors brought an end to the blood letting.
The sunni awakening was now in full implementation as an ally to the US. This fact continues to push al Qaeda out of operational areas.
The shia militias under Sadr recognized they could make more progress via political means than they could in a direct confrontation with fighting the US and Iraqi Army coalition. Muqtada's order for a cease fire, twice renewed now, did more for the peace of Iraq than any one other factor. His departure from confrontation with sunni and the US might still fracture the shia militia into multiple sects not all loyal to Sadr but it holds mostly for now.
U.S. military and intelligence officials say there are at least twenty-three militias in operation, according to the Washington Post. They range in capability and effectiveness, and the majority of them are Shiite.
The Iraqi Army has enjoyed successful operations (although poorly conducted and dependant on the US to avoid embarrassing failure) in the calm derived from the Sadr cease fire and the sunni halt on the insurgency.
In the so called success of the surge the world must recognize the truth as it is. The US props up the Iraqi Army both logistically and (more and more less so) operationally. The sunni Sons of Iraq are being armed and supported by the US. This is defeating al Qaeda tactically but is actually building a strategic powder keg in terms of Iraq;s future. The shia militia are still stockpiling weapons from Iran and their cease fire is loyal to Sadr, not the Iraqi peace process.
This is not something that American soldiers can fix. The institution into which we've poured the most time and money—the Iraqi Army—is the most effective one in the country. (So much so that more than one Iraqi politician expressed concern to me about the possibility of a coup.) But we're not likely to have a similar impact on the ministries of housing, or transport, or electricity. No one doubts that U.S. troops have been crucial to establishing what calm does prevail in Iraq. But we're not the ones who can ensure that it lasts. [Source]
So can we call the surge a success when all sides are being allowed weapons and time to improve their position in the lull that is allowing the US and Iraqi politicians to talk of a US withdrawal? The critical point for a peaceful Iraq in a post US occupation is gone. The future of Iraq in a post US occupation will depend on the reconciliation efforts of the Iraqis themselves. Not all is lost if a miracle can be worked which folds all the armed groups into an accountable and centralized power structure (like a national guard). But peace depends on a lot of hope and prayers.
The seeds of hate might not be buried deep enough and we will likely see a return of violence. This time from groups armed and trained by the US that fail to find common ground (with the common enemy of the US gone) and turn on each other.
If Iraq collapses into chaos and genocide months or years from now will Americans still look at the time of the surge where they armed all the waring groups to buy a false peace and still call it a success?
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